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Recent studies on the growth effects of exchange rate regimes offer a wide range of different, 
sometimes contradictory results. In this paper, we systematically compare three prominent 
contributions in this field. Using a common data set, a common specification, and common 
estimation methods, we argue that the contradictory findings can be explained by the fact that 
these studies use regime classifications which reflect fundamentally different aspects of 
exchange rate policy. 
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  11. Introduction 
 
The relative advantages of different exchange rate regimes are subject to ongoing discussions 
among policymakers and academics. It is thus not surprising that considerable attention is 
devoted to the question whether there is an empirical relationship between a country’s 
exchange rate regime and important macroeconomic targets: does a fixed exchange rate 
regime enhance price stability? Does the flexibility associated with floating exchange rates 
dampen the effects of real shocks and thus lower macroeconomic volatility? And which 
exchange rate regime is correlated with higher growth rates of real per-capita income?
1 While 
these questions have been raised repeatedly throughout the post-war era (Mussa 1986, Baxter 
and Stockman 1989), the more recent past has seen a veritable boom of studies that 
investigate the empirical relationship between countries’ exchange rate regimes and their 
macroeconomic performance. This collective research effort is lead by the comprehensive 
monograph of Gosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) as well as the widely-quoted papers by Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) and  Rogoff, Husain, Mody, Brooks and Oomes (2003).
2  
There are different explanations for the renewed interest in the macroeconomic effects 
of exchange rate regimes: first, recent historical experience – the spectacular sucess of 
exchange-rate based stabilization programs, the introduction of the Euro, but also the collapse 
of fixed exchange rate regimes in several emerging markets – has spurred the discussion 
about the superiority of certain exchange rate arrangements. Second, with 30 years having 
passed since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, there is a sufficient variety of 
regime choices and macroeconomic experiences to reasonably assess this question. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, researchers can now use several new data sets which allow to 
distinguish between countries’ de-jure exchange rate regimes and the exchange rate policy 
that was actually implemented by monetary authorities. Such a distinction is important since, 
on the one hand, many countries tolerated – and still tolerate – the existence of parallel 
foreign exchange markets, and in these countries the stability of the official exchange rate 
often conveys a wrong impression about the volatility of the “relevant” (parallel) exchange 
rate. On the other hand,  some countries’ currencies are much less volatile than would be 
justified by the official exchange rate regime – a discrepancy for which Calvo and Reinhart 
                                                 
1 A discussion of the theoretical arguments in favor of pegs and floats would go beyond the scope of our 
investigation. Concise presentations of those arguments are offered by Gosh et al.  (2002) and Rogoff et al. 
(2003). 
2 A slightly modified version of Rogoff et al. (2003) was published  in the  Journal of Monetary Economics 
(Husain et al., 2005). In what follows, we refer to the longer IMF Working-Paper. A twin version of  Levy-
Yeyati und Sturzenegger (2003) appeared in the  European Economic Review ( Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 
2005). 
  2(2002) have coined the term “fear of floating”. The possibility to distinguish between a 
country’s officially announced regime and its implemented policy has certainly contributed to 
the recent popularity of this research topic.  
Those who expect the recent literature to deliver a quick and definite answer on the 
superiority of certain exchange rate regimes, are, however, likely to be disappointed: the 
different studies offer a variety of contradictory, sometimes mutually exclusive results, and 
only some aspects – e.g. the positive effect of fixed exchange rate regimes on price stability – 
meet broad empirical support. The differences between the individual results on the 
relationship between exchange rate regimes and economic growth are particularly striking: 
Gosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002, in what follows denoted by GGW) find a slightly positive, but 
not very robust effect of fixed exchange rates. Conversely, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003, in what follows: LYS) present evidence that flexible exchange rates are associated 
with higher growth rates, especially in non-industrial countries. Rogoff et al. (2003, in what 
follows: RHMBO) also find a significantly positive effect of flexible exchange rates, but only 
for rich (“advanced”) economies. Hence, there is a confusing plethora of results and 
conclusions, and the observer is left with the question which of these findings – if any – he is 
to trust. 
The aim of our study is to shed some light on the relationship between exchange rate 
regimes and economic growth by systematically comparing the three studies mentioned 
above. Such a comparison promises various insights: first, it makes it easier to assess which 
results are driven by  the choice of a particular sample, model specification, or estimation 
method. Second, and more importantly, it allows to interpret the economic content of the 
different results: the individual studies are using classification schemes which reflect 
fundamentally different aspects of exchange rate policy: the classification of GGW is based 
on countries’ official announcements about their exchange rate regimes. Conversely, LYS 
classify “de-facto” regimes by considering the observed volatility of the (official) exchange 
rate and the fluctuations of countries’ foreign exchange reserves. Finally, RHMBO use the 
“natural classification” of  Reinhart und Rogoff (2004, in what follows: RR), which focuses 
on the volatility of the relevant (possibly parallel) exchange rate. These fundamental 
differences between the three classification methods allow for the possibility that all results 
are, in some well-defined way, „correct“: it is conceivable that the effects of an announced 
peg differ from the effects of active exchange rate stabilization. And the impact of a stable 
exchange rate may crucially depend on whether this stability is associated with fluctuations in 
a country’s stock of foreign reserves or not. The seemingly contradictory results would thus 
  3indicate that different aspects of “exchange rate stability” differ in their effects on growth. 
However, to arrive at such a conclusion, we first have to put the individual studies on an equal 
footing.  
In the rest of the paper, we proceed as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the principles 
underlying the different classification methods. In Section 3, we summarize the results of the 
existing literature and describe the problems with interpreting these findings. Section 4 
explains our econometric model and the data we use. Section 5 presents and interprets our 
own empirical results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Identifying exchange rate regimes: a brief review 
 
2.1. De-jure and de-facto classifications 
In this section, we briefly recapitulate the approaches of GGW, LYS and RR to identify the 
exchange rate regime prevailing in a given country at a given point in time. For the GGW 
classification, this is fairly simple: In their study, these authors adopt the information given by 
countries’ monetary authorities, as published in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
3 Hence, they use a pure de-jure classification 
which reflects the officially announced strategy of countries’ monetary authorities. 
The approaches of LYS and RR are more sophisticated. The goal of these 
classifications is to go beyond official announcements and to identify countries’ de-facto 
regimes, based on the properties of observed time series. In what follows, we briefly describe 
both approaches.  
 
2.2. The classification of  Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) 
LYS identify a country’s de-facto exchange rate regime by considering the following 
variables: the volatility of the bilateral nominal exchange rate with respect to some anchor 
currency ) ( e σ
4, the volatility of exchange rate changes ) ( e ∆ σ , and the volatility of foreign 
reserves  ) ( r σ .  Having computed these statistics, all country-year observations are assigned 
to one of four regimes: „Flexible“, „Dirty Float“, „Crawling Peg“ or „Fix“. In classifying 
observations, the authors are led by the following considerations: with a flexible exchange 
                                                 
3 GGW also develop a „consensus classification“, which eliminates observations for which the volatility of the 
exchange rate is not compatible with the official announcement (Gosh et al., 2002:46 ff.). To highlight the 
difference between de-jure and de-facto regimes, we neglect the „consensus classification“. 
4 Both LYS and RR base their classifications on bilateral exchange rates. While Dubas et al. (2005) point out that 
the focus on bilateral exchange rates may exaggerate exchange rate fluctuations, the use of effective exchange 
rates meets severe data limits.  
  4rate,  e σ  and  e ∆ σ  should be rather high. Conversely,  r σ  should be low since there is no need 
for central bank intervention in the presence of a floating exchange rate. By contrast, frequent 
interventions in case of a fixed exchange rate regime should be reflected by a high value of  
r σ  , while  e σ  and  e ∆ σ  should be low. The intermediate solutions  (Dirty Float und Crawling 
Peg) should be characterized by both high exchange rate volatility and large fluctuations in 
reserves. If all three variables are low, an observation is categorized as “inconclusive”. 
To identify the de-facto exchange rate regime prevailing in a country during a given 
year, LYS use K-Means cluster analysis, whose algorithm is based on the  “nearest centroid 
sorting“- approach. They first define the number of „clusters“  - i.e. the number of different 
exchange rate regimes. Based on this decision, observations in the ( e σ ,  e ∆ σ ,  r σ )-space are 
assigned to one of those clusters, following the objective to minimize the distance between 
observations and the clusters’ centers. These centers, in turn, are identified through 
subsequent iterations.  
 
2.3. The „Natural Classification“ of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
To classify exchange rate regimes, RR use comprehensive country chronologies which offer 
information on the prevailing official exchange rate regime, the relevant anchor currency, and 
on important economic events. In addition, they analyze the statistical properties of the 
official and (if available) parallel exchange rate. RR justify their focus on parallel market data 
by pointing out the systematic deviations of parallel market rates from official rates. 
Moreover, they argue that, in many countries, parallel rates are more relevant for economic 
transactions than official rates. In a first step, all country-years that are characterized by an 
annual inflation rate above 40 percent are assigned to a special category labelled „freely 
falling“. RR justify this approach by arguing that countries with extremely high inflation rates 
are hit by macroeconomic shocks that should not be associated with a particular exchange rate 
regime (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004:16). If the inflation rate is below 40 percent, the de-facto 
exchange rate regime depends on the volatility of the “relevant” exchange rate, which may be 
the rate observed on the parallel exchange market. 
 
2.4. Reserves volatility and the de-facto classifications 
It is important to note that the “natural classification” of RR does not provide any information 
about the sources of exchange rate stability: while LYS identify a de-facto peg if (and only if) 
a low volatility of the official exchange rate is combined with strong fluctuations in foreign 
reserves, the RR pegs do not reveal whether exchange rate stability stems from active central 
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very important when it comes to interpreting our empirical results. 
  To assess whether differences between the two classifications actually stem from the 
consideration (LYS) or neglect (RR) of reserves volatility or simply from the different 
methodologies applied (cluster analysis vs. the definition of critical band widths) we 
computed the average annual reserves volatility associated with LYS pegs and RR pegs, 
respectively. As expected, average reserves volatility for LYS pegs is 13 percent higher than 
for RR pegs. Moreover, we ran probit regressions to explore whether, for a given variability 
of the nominal exchange rate, reserves volatility significantly raises the likelihood to have a 
country-year classified as a peg. We found that this is indeed the case for LYS pegs. 
Conversely, reserves volatility has no significant impact on the likelihood that a country-year 
is classified as a peg à la RR.
5 These findings confirm our notion that, in addition to stemming 
from different methodological approaches, the regime classifications reflect different aspects 
of exchange rate stability – most importantly, the extent to which this stability is associated 
with active foreign exchange interventions and volatile reserves. 
 
2.5. Regime-Dummies 
The studies we discuss determine the empirical effect of the exchange rate regime on 
economic growth by including several „exchange rate regime dummies“ in a standard growth 
regression. The dummies take the value of one if a specific exchange rate regime prevailed in 
a given period, and zero otherwise.  
Most of our regressions follow the contributions of GGW and LYS in using three 
regime dummies: fixed exchange rates („pegs“), intermediate regimes („intermediates“), and 
flexible exchange rates („floats“).  By contrast, we substantially deviate from the approach of 
RHMBO in the following respect: as reported above, the RR classification used by RHMBO 
assigns all those country-years in which the annual inflation rate exceeds 40 percent to a 
separate „freely falling“-category.
6 We think that this strategy is problematic: first, the 
threshold of 40 percent is quite arbitrary.
7 Second, we argue that this procedure leads to 
potentially biased results: considering the relationship between exchange rate regimes and 
price stability, GGW and RHMBO demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, pegs lead to lower 
inflation rates. Since periods of high inflation are usually associated with low or even negative 
                                                 
5 The results of these regressions are available upon request. 
6 In the sample we use for our estimations, approximately ten percent of all country-years are classified as 
„freely-falling”. 
7 Referring to Easterly (2001), Reinhart und Rogoff (2004:45) describe the critical value of 40 percent as „…an 
important benchmark in the literature on the determinants of growth“. 
  6growth (see, e.g., Bruno and Easterly, 1998),   the positive role of fixed exchange rate regimes 
is likely to be underrated if those episodes are assigned to a separate category. We therefore 
decided to assign RR’s „freely-falling”- observations to one of the three exchange rate 
regimes. To do this, we used the information given in the RR data appendix and retrieved the 
regime to which a country-year would have belonged, had it not been classified as “freely 
falling”. The result is a „modified“ RR-classification (RR
mod), which assigns all observations 
to a de-facto exchange rate regime, even if the inflation rate exceeds 40 percent. Needless to 
say that we will later examine the importance of this modification for our results. 
In addition to the three-way classification, we also use a four-way classification which 
splits the group of „intermediate regimes“ into two subgroups: one group of country-years 
whose exchange rate policy was characterized by extensive, mostly rule-based interventions 
in foreign exchange markets  („limited flexibility“), and another group of country-years, in 
which interventions were mosty discretionary („managed float“). LYS offer both a three-way 
and a four-way classification which we could directly retrieve from the authors’ homepage. 
To transform the detailed classifications of GGW and RR into a four-way classification, we 
followed the approach of Alesina and Wagner (2006). Details are given in the data appendix. 
 
3. Exchange rate regimes and economic growth: previous results 
 
As indicated in the introduction, the studies of GGW, LYS and RHMBO present very 
different results on the relationship between exchange rate regimes and growth. GGW start by 
finding a slight superiority of pegs, but show that this result is not very robust and eventually 
conclude: „Overall, and in line with the theoretical literature, the results do not suggest a 
strong link between the exchange rate regime and real GDP growth“ (Gosh et al., 2002:98). 
Conversely, LYS summarize their results as follows: „In particular, we found that, for the 
former [i.e. non-industrial countries], fixed exchange rates are connected with slower growth 
rates and higher output volatility, an association that proved to be robust to several alternative 
specifications and checks“ (Levy-Yeyati und Sturzenegger, 2003:1187). RHMBO who use 
the RR “natural classification” also find a positive influence of exchange rate flexibility on 
growth, but this effect is limited to the small group of rich (“advanced”) countries (Rogoff et 
al., 2003:44). For the other two country groups – “emerging markets” and “developing 
countries” – the authors do not find a relationship between exchange rate regimes and growth. 
Finally, Aghion et al. (2006) demonstrate that the relationship between exchange rate 
flexibility and productivity growth is nonlinear: in countries with a developed financial sector, 
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credit constraints, exchange rate fluctuations reduce their capability to invest in research and 
development and thus hamper growth. Since financial sector development is associated with 
income levels, Aghion (2006) offer a compelling explanation why the growth effects of 
exchange rate flexibility differ across income groups. Moreover, their result not only holds for 
the RR “natural classification”, but for a host of alternative measures of exchange rate 
flexibility. However, the relevant coefficients switch signs if the original LYS-classification is 
used. 
There are various explanations for the contradictory results of the recent literature: the 
different studies refer to different country samples and time intervals: GGW and RHMBO 
consider annual data between 1970 and 1999, while LYS focus on the years 1974 to 2000. 
Conversely, Aghion et al. (2006) consider five-year averages between 1960 and 2000. In 
addition, LYS use a larger number of countries than RHMBO and GGW. The studies also 
differ in their choice of control variables that are used to mitigate omitted-variable-bias. 
Finally, the different analyses use different estimators: while most of the results of GGW and 
LYS are based on simple OLS-regressions, RHMBO exploit the panel structure of the data set 
and use a „fixed-effects“-estimator, while Aghion et al. (2006) choose a dynamic panel 
(GMM) estimator. Concerning the classification methods, it is quite obvious that the different 
approaches – the use of official announcements (GGW), an endogenous classification by 
means of cluster analysis (LYS), or a classification based on the observed volatility of 
(parallel) exchange rates (RR) – lead to different results. The strategy of RR to assign high-
inflation periods to a separate „freely falling“ category may be another reason why the 
findings of RHMBO differ from those of LYS. 
Given all those differences, it is hard to assess whether the studies’ contradictory 
results convey any insights beyond the trivial statement that distinct methodological choices 
result in different empirical conclusions. By using a common data set, model specification, 
and estimation method we eliminate the technical and methodological differences between the 
three studies, and we hope to get closer to the economic core of their findings.  
 
4. Exchange rate regimes and growth: data and estimation  
 
Most of our results are based on estimating the following equation for annual observations 
between 1974 and 1999: 







it peg it x int Dum peg Dum Growth ε ξ β γ γ + + + + = ∑
=
, _ _  (1) 
In (1),  Growthit is the growth rate of real per-capita income of country i in year t, 




it Dum int _ { }
mod , , RR LYS GGW j∈  are the dummy variables for pegs 
and intermediate regimes, as described in the preceding section. Hence, the dummies’ 
coefficients represent the performance of exchange rate regimes relative to a pure float, which 
is the omitted category. The variables xk,it are the control variables listed below, and ξt is a 
time dummy which captures world-wide variations in growth rates. We make no assumption 
on the homoskedasticity and serial correlation of  εit, and the t-statistics we present are based 
on a „cluster-robust“ covariance matrix. 
While the use of annual data in a growth regression is not above all criticism, we 
choose this frequency to make our results comparable with those of GGW, LYS, and 
RHMBO. Concerning the choice of control variables, we closely follow the preceding studies 
and use a specification that allows to replicate their „benchmark results“.  The following 
variables enter the vector x: The share of investment in GDP (invest), a measure of openness 
to international trade (open), the change of the terms of trade during the preceding three years 
(terms-of-trade), the average school enrolment rate (schooling), the government’s budget 
surplus as a share of GDP, lagged by one period (budget_1),  the log of the country’s per-
capita income relative to the USA in 1970 (income_ini), the population growth rate 
(pop_growth), the logarithm of the population size (log_pop), the Freedom House measure of 
the repression of civil liberties (civil_repress), and dummies for transition countries 
(dum_trans) , oil-rich countries (dum_oil), countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (reg_ssa) , and 
countries in Latin America. (reg_lac).
8
 
5. Exchange rate regimes and growth: Results  
 
5.1. Results for the complete sample 
5.1.1. Three-way classifications 
The results in Table 1 are based on estimating equation (1) by OLS. Column (1.1) uses the 
dummies for pegs and intermediate regimes based on GGW, column (1.2) refers to the three-
way classification of LYS, column (1.3) refers to the (modified) RR
mod -classification. The 
coefficients of the control variables, while not of crucial interest, have the expected signs, and 
                                                 
8 Detailed information on the definition and sources of control variables are given in the data appendix. 
  9most of them are significant.
9 Concerning the signs of the regime dummies, we generally 
replicate the results of the studies introduced above: when we use the de-jure classification of 
GGW (column 1.1), pegs and intermediate regimes seem to be superior to a floating exchange 
rate. The opposite holds if the de-facto classification of LYS is used (column 1.2): the 
variables Dum_peg and Dum_int have negative signs and are statistically significant. The de-
facto-classification of RR
mod (column 1.3) yields results which are similar to those in column 
1.1, and suggest that a stable exchange rate has a positive effect on economic growth. This 
finding differs from the results of RHMBO. Recall, however, that we are using a modified 
version of the original RR classification which does not single out “freely-falling” episodes. 
 
5.1.2. Four-way classifications and flexibility index 
If we use the four-way classification described in section 2.4 , we are estimating a slightly 
modified version of equation (1): 









it peg it x an m Dum lim Dum peg Dum Growth ε ξ β γ γ γ + + + + + = ∑
=
, _ _ _  (2) 
where Dum_lim and Dum_man represent episodes characterized by „limited flexibility“ and 
„managed floating“, respectively, and „pure float“ is, again, the omitted category. The results 
of estimating (2) by OLS are reported in columns 2.1 to 2.3 of Table 2 and confirm the results 
of Table 1: According to the classifications of GGW and RR
mod, pegs perform better than 
floats, the coefficients of the LYS dummies suggest the opposite. 
An alternative to using binary dummy variables is to construct a „flexibility index“ 
whose value increases as we move from pegs to floats.
10 Based on the four-way classification, 
this variable has the value of one in case of a peg, two if a country has a regime with „limited 
flexibility“ etc. When we use this flexibility index, our results do not differ substantially from 
our previous findings: the sign is negative for the GGW- and RR
mod-classifications, while 
exchange rate flexibility has a positive (though not significant) influence on growth if the 
LYS-classification is used (see columns 2.4 to 2.6 in Table 2).
11 We conjecture that the low t-
statistic of the flexibility index  à la LYS is due to the imposition of a linear relationship 
which is not justified by the dummies’ coefficients (see column 2.2 in Table 2). 
 
                                                 
9 To save space, the tables do not include the coefficients of the period dummies, which, by and large, reflect the 
evolution of the global business cycle – in particular the recession of the early 1980s and the boom of the mid-
1990s. 
10 This approach is chosen by  Aghion et al. (2006). 
11 While our previous results did not hinge on assigning freely-falling episodes to exchange rate regimes – i.e. on 
using the modified RR-classification  (RR
mod) – the coefficient of the RR-flexibility index turned positive, but 
insignificant, when we omitted freely-falling episodes. 
  105.1.3. Alternative estimation methods 
Two econometric problems make it hard to interpret the results presented so far: it is possible 
that the estimated coefficients merely reflect the influence of country-specific characteristics 
which are correlated with the regressors but are not explicitly included in the equation. The 
risk of such an “omitted variable bias” is particularly high in cross-country samples, which 
are characterized by an enormous degree of unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, the strong 
correlations we reported in the preceding sections need not indicate causal relationships. 
Especially when it comes to the de-facto classifications, it is possible that exchange rate 
stability is both a cause and a consequence of economic growth. If this were indeed the case, 
the de-facto exchange rate regime would be an endogenous variable, and the results presented 
above would have to be interpreted with extreme caution. 
An appropriate method to acount for unobserved heterogeneity and to reduce omitted 
variable bias is to use a „fixed effects“ estimator, which essentially introduces a set of dummy 
variables that capture country-specific, but time-invariant characteristics. Columns 3.1 to 3.3. 
in Table 3 present the results of applying this estimator, using the different four-way 
classifications. Apparently, the GGW-dummies are no longer significant, and some of the 
coefficients have their signs reversed. The dummies from the LYS-classification keep their 
signs, but the coefficient of the peg-dummy is no longer significant. Conversely, the 
coefficients based on the RR
mod-classification confirm the results presented in Table 2 and 
suggest that higher exchange rate flexibility is associated with lower growth. To explain the 
poor performance of the GGW dummies, one has to take into account a crucial property of the 
fixed effects estimator: while reducing the effect of unobserved heterogeneity, this estimator 
transforms both the dependent variable and the regressors into deviations from country-
specific means, and thus essentially switches off the cross-sectional dimension of the data. 
Hence, while reflecting the importance of country-specific factors for the choice of exchange 
rate regimes, the low t-statistics are also due to the low time-variation of the (GGW) regime 
dummies. 
The problem of potential endogeneity can be met by using an instrumental variables 
(IV) estimator. This estimator replaces potentially endogenous variables with the fitted values 
of a regression where those variables are regressed on a set of exogenous factors 
(“instruments”).
12 These instruments should be correlated with the endogenous variables, but 
not with the disturbance ε  . To instrument for our flexibility index, we use the following 
                                                 
12 Since disturbances are likely to be heteroskedastic, it is preferable to use a GMM estimator. Baum et al. (2003) 
offer a concise survey on the relevant techniques. 
  11variables
13: country size in square kilometres (area), the geographical concentration of 
exports (xport3), a dummy for a high share of non-fuel raw materials in exports   
(exp_nonfuel), the Freedom House measure of political repression (pol_repress), and the 
frequency at which the head of the central bank was replaced in the preceding five years 
(cbturn5). Columns 3.4 and 3.5 in Table 3 demonstrate that the qualitative effect of the 
exchange rate regime does not disappear if we use GMM instead of OLS estimation.
14  
 
5.1.4. The role of the parallel market 
By and large, the results presented so far replicate the contradictions described in the opening 
sections: if exchange rate regimes are classified according to LYS, floats appear more 
advantageous than pegs, if the classifications of GGW or RR
mod are used, the data suggest the 
opposite. The discrepancy between LYS and RR
mod is particularly surprising since both 
methods claim to provide a de-facto classification of exchange rate regimes.  
One reason for this striking difference could be that LYS focus on the official 
exchange rate, while RR use parallel exchange rates to classify the de-facto exchange rate 
regime. In developing countries, a stable exchange rate is often associated with a considerable 
misalignment, and this gives rise to an active parallel market. It is thus conceivable that the 
negative coefficient of the peg dummy according to LYS does not prove the advantages of 
exchange rate flexibility, but the growth-depressing distortions that are associated with a 
severe exchange rate misalignment. To check whether this suspicion gets empirical support, 
we use the parallel market premium (parallel_premium) – i.e. the markup of the parallel 
exchange rate over the official rate – as an additional regressor in equation (1). The results in 
Table 4 demonstrate that this variable has the expected negative sign. However, instead of 
weakening our previous findings, it reinforces them. It is thus unlikely that the LYS result 
merely reflects the distortionary effects of persistent exchange rate misalignments.  
 
5.2. Different country groups 
5.2.1. Industrial vs. Non-industrial countries 
Both GGW, LYS and RHMBO discuss the possibility that the effects of exchange rate 
regimes differ across country groups and therefore run their regressions for different samples. 
In this subsection we follow the approach of LYS and divide our sample into “industrial” and 
                                                 
13 Using the flexibility index instead of regime dummies substantially facilitates IV estimation.  
14 Note, however, that the p-value of Hansen’s J-statistic, which is a test of overidentifying restrictions, barely 
prevents us from  rejecting the null hypothesis that our instruments are exogenous.  
  12“non-industrial” economies.
15 The results for both groups are presented in Table 5.
16 Rows 
5.1 to 5.3 demonstrate that the qualitative discrepancies between the different classifications 
vanish almost entirely when the analysis is restricted to industrial countries: for this group, all 
classifications clearly document a better performance of flexible regimes. Conversely, the 
results for non-industrial countries (rows 5.4 to 5.6) replicate the difference between  the three 
classification methods, although the coefficient of the LYS peg dummy is not significant.
17 
This suggests that the different results on the growth effects of exchange rate regimes in the 
complete sample are mainly driven by the group of non-industrial countries. 
 
5.2.2. Advanced countries /emerging markets / developing countries 
An alternative decomposition of the complete sample is suggested by RHMBO: They 
distinguish (high-income) „advanced countries“, „emerging markets“, which are covered by 
the Morgan Stanley MSCI-Index, and “developing countries” which belong to neither of the 
two previous groups.
18 While this distinction is not above all criticism – it might, for example, 
be debated whether Bahrain and the Bahamas belong into the same group as France and the 
USA – it has the advantage of singling out the group of emerging market countries  where a 
combination of high capital mobility and weak institutions raises the vulnerability for 
financial crises. Rows 5.7 to 5.15 in Table 5 essentially confirm the impression we got when 
using the industrial/non-industrial decomposition: for the rich economies, we get an almost 
unanimous verdict that exchange rate flexibility enhances growth (rows 5.7 to 5.9). For the 
emerging markets, by contrast, the classifications of GGW and RR
mod emphasize the 
advantages of a stable exchange rate, while LYS suggest that flexible regimes have a positive 
(though not significant) effect on growth rates (rows 5.10 to 5.12). Surprisingly, only the 
RR
mod-classification suggests that the exchange rate regime has any growth effects in the 
remaining group of “developing countries” (rows 5.13 to 5.15). 
 
5.3. The role of high inflation rates and currency crises 
5.3.1. High inflation rates 
As detailed in Section 2.4, the preceding results have been based on a modified RR 
classification (RR
mod), which assigns all “freely falling” episodes to an exchange rate regime 
                                                 
15 The composition of these groups is given in the data appendix. 
16 The coefficients of the control variables are suppressed to save space, but are available on request. 
17 This sheds a dubious light on the robustness of the LYS-results,  since Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003)  
emphasize the importance of exchange rate flexibility for  non-industrial countries.  Edwards and Levy-Yeyati 
(2005) argue that this is due to a flexible exchange rate’s greater ability to absorb real (terms of trade) shocks. 
18 The composition of these groups is given in the data appendix. 
  13instead of treating them as a separate category. In this section, we explore the importance of 
this modification and the role of high inflation rates. We proceed in two ways: first, “freely 
falling episodes” are set equal to zero in all three classifications.
19  Alternatively, a “freely-
falling dummy” is used as a separate regressor. 
The consequences of „neutralizing“ the freely-falling episodes for all regime 
classifications are displayed in rows 6.1 to 6.3 of Table 6. The only contrast to the previous 
results is that the coefficient of the peg-dummy à la LYS now indicates a significantly positive 
effect of fixed exchange rates. This suggests that the superiority of floats in previous 
regressions was driven by a number of episodes which LYS classified as de-facto pegs, and 
which were characterized by high inflation and low growth rates.
20
When we return to the original classifications but introduce a freely-falling dummy  
(dum_FF), the changes are more dramatic  (see rows  6.4 to 6.6 in Table 6): while the 
coefficient of the freely-falling dummy is negative and highly significant, the regime 
dummies per se do not seem to be very important. This suggests the following interpretation: 
the superior growth performance of  pegs à la GGW and RR
mod that was documented by our 
previous regressions apparently resulted from the fact that de-jure and de-facto exchange rate 
stability reduce the likelihood of very high inflation rates.
21 Once these high-inflation 
episodes are captured by a separate control variable, the exchange rate regime is no longer 
important. Note that this does not imply that the choice of exchange rate regime is generally 
irrelevant: first, very high inflation rates are usually observed in developing countries and 
emerging markets, such that the negative growth effect of pegs we found for the group of 
industrial countries is likely to survive an explicit consideration of freely-falling episodes.
22 
Second, in looking at the low t-statistics in Table 6, we must not forget the influence of the 
exchange rate regime on the likelihood of high inflation rates. Hence, even if the direct 
growth effect of a fixed exchange rate is small once high inflation episodes are controlled for, 
the indirect effect may be substantial. 
 
 
                                                 
19 For the RR-classification, this means that, instead of assigning freely-falling episodes to a de-facto exchange 
rate regime, we are using the original regime dummies of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), which are set to zero in 
freely-falling episodes. To highlight this difference, we label column 6.3 as referring to RR. 
20 This conjecture is supported by Aghion et al. (2006:23) who find that the difference between exchange rate 
volatility à la LYS and exchange rate volatility à la RR/GGW disappears once freely-falling episodes are 
eliminated and periods with dual exchange rates are reclassified according to RR. 
21 When we used the non-modified RR-classification in which freely-falling episodes are set equal to zero, we 
got the same result, i.e. the regime dummies turned insignificant once dum_FF was introduced as a separate 
regressor.  
22 A regression that exclusively focuses on industrial countries supports this conjecture. 
  145.3.2. Currency crises 
The results presented in the previous subsection suggest that our initial findings were driven 
by a number of „exceptional episodes“. Apart from considering the high-inflation years 
identified by RR, it is therefore worth wile to isolate country-years characterized by currency 
crises. Rows 6.7 to 6.9 in Table 6 present the results we got when we omitted currency-crises 
episodes from our sample.
23  Interestingly, this modification hardly has an effect on the signs 
and significance of the regime dummies according to GGW and LYS. However, the superior 
growh performance of pegs à la RR
mod disappears almost completely. This indicates that the 
preference for de-facto exchange rate stability suggested by the RR
mod-classification is due to 




5.4. “Fear of floating“ and „Fear of pegging“  
In our previous estimations, we separately considered the classifications of GGW, LYS and 
RR
mod. As mentioned above, these classifications reflect different aspects of exchange rate 
policy: GGW focus on official announcements (“words”), LYS on active exchange rate 
stabilization (“deeds”), and RR
mod on the resulting volatility of the relevant exchange rate 
(“outcomes”). In this section, we explore whether the discrepancy between words, deeds, and 
outcomes has an influence on economic growth which goes beyond the effect of the officially 
announced regime.
25 Does the “fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) enhance growth, 
i.e. is it recommended to implicitly stabilize the exchange rate instead of officially announcing 
a peg? Are there benefits of allowing the exchange rate to be more volatile than would be 
justified by the official regime – a strategy labeled “fear of pegging” by Alesina and Wagner 
(2006)? 
To answer these questions, we proceed as follows: In addition to the GGW regime 
dummies we use a dummy „Dum_FoF“ which is one if the de-facto regime is more rigid than 
the de-jure regime, i.e. if we observe “fear of floating”. Conversely, the dummy “Dum_FoP” 
is one whenever the de-facto regime is more flexible than the de-jure regime, i.e. if there is a 
                                                 
23 To identify currency crises, we used an index provided by GGW, which is based on Glick and Hutchison 
(1999). 
24 When we followed Aghion et al. (2006) by adding a currency-crisis dummy instead of omitting these episodes 
the results presented in the preceding sections did not change. 
25 Genberg und Swoboda (2005) argue that the effects of announcements may differ from those of actual 
policies. Dubas et al. (2005) explore the consequences of “words” deviating from “deeds” for economic growth. 
However, they limit their attention to their own „effective“ regime classification and only distinguish between 
fixed and flexible exchange rates. 
  15“fear of pegging”. Since we consider two de-facto classifications, we compute these dummies 
for both the LYS and the RR
mod-classification. 
Table 7 presents the results. Column 7.1 refers to the entire sample and shows that a 
strategy of implicitly stabilizing the exchange rate reduces growth if the de-facto 
classification of LYS is used. The FoP-dummy is not significant. Column 7.2 shows that, for 
the complete sample, discrepancies between de-jure and de-facto regimes à la RR
mod have no 
significant effect on growth. As before, there are marked differences if we differentiate 
between industrial and non-industrial countries: the significant effect of the FoF- and FoP-
dummmies disappears in the industrial-countries subsample if we use the de-facto 
classification of LYS (column 7.3) while the RR
mod-classification reveals a significantly 
negative effect of a “fear of floating” and a positive effect of a “fear of pegging” (column 
7.4). If we focus on non-industrial countries, the LYS-classification suggests a negative effect 
of an implicit exchange rate stabilization (column 7.5). By contrast, this strategy is associated 
with higher growth rates if the de-facto exchange rate regime is identified à la RR
mod (column 
7.6). 
We believe that both the coincidences and the differences reported above illustrate the 
different aspects of exchange rate policy that are captured by the classifications of LYS and 
RR
mod: apparently, industrial countries benefit in terms of a better growth performance if the 
exchange rate fluctuates stronger than suggested by the officially announced regime, i.e. if  
monetary authorities allow the exchange rate to absorb macroeconomic shocks without 
jeopardizing the credibility conveyed by a de-jure peg. Conversely, a strategy of implicit 
exchange rate stabilization – i.e. a “fear of floating” – seems to result in higher growth when 
non-industrial are considered: due to weak financial institutions, widespread liability 
dollarization and an exposure to sudden stops,  depreciations of the domestic currency are 
often contractionary in these countries (Calvo, 2005),  and limiting exchange rate fluctuations 
may contribute to macroeconomic stability. The contrast between the negative coefficient of 
the FoP-dummy à la LYS and the positive coefficient for the FoP-dummy à la RR
mod indicates 
that we need to qualify this statement:  an implicit exchange rate stabilization seems to be 
counterproductive if it is enforced by means of heavy foreign exchange intervention. By 
contrast, if exchange rate stability reflects a stable macroeconomic environment as well as a 




  166. Concluding remarks 
 
Our goal was to shed some light on the confusing variety of results concerning the 
relationship between exchange rate regimes and economic growth. We tried to figure out to 
which extent these contradictory results provide economic insights that go beyond technical 
and methodological differences, and started from the simple diagnosis that the different 
studies use classification methods which emphasize different aspects of exchange rate 
stability – the signaling function of official announcements (GGW), the combination of 
exchange rate stability and reserves volatility characterizing an active exchange rate 
stabilization (LYS), or the de-facto fluctuations of the “relevant” exchange rate (RR). Our 
analysis was driven by the notion that the different results on the exchange-rate 
regime/growth relationship reveal which of these aspects have a positive or negative effect on 
growth. Based on these considerations, we summarize our main results. 
Our estimates show that the various classification methods yield fairly similar results 
if attention is restricted to industrial countries: for this group, exchange rate flexibility is 
associated with higher growth rates. Conversely, we find strong differences between the 
individual classifications if we consider the subsample of (“non-industrial”) developing 
countries and emerging markets. In these countries, both the announcement of a peg (GGW) 
and de-facto stability of the (parallel) exchange rate (RR) have a positive impact on growth. 
However, the results we got when we used the de-facto classification of LYS suggest that the 
relationship turns negative if exchange rate stability is due to heavy intervention in foreign 
exchange markets. 
Our study also demonstrates that the strong results are essentially driven by a (large) 
number of high-inflation episodes. If we explicitly control for the occurrence of high inflation 
rates, the exchange rate regime does not seem to have a direct effect on economic growth. 
However, this finding should not mask the important indirect effects of the exchange rate 
regime, in particular the negative influence of a peg on the likelihood of high inflation. 
When it comes to exploring the consequences of “fear of floating” and “fear of 
pegging”, it is once more important to differentiate between industrial and non-industrial 
countries: industrial countries seem to benefit from allowing exchange rate fluctuations that 
occur in the shadow of a rigid official regime. In non-industrial countries, by contrast, a 
strategy of implicit exchange rate stabilization seems to yield higher growth, unless it is 
associated with strong fluctuations of foreign reserves and heavy foreign exchange 
intervention. 
  17While we believe that our study has clarified a number of important issues, we are realistic 
about the size of the unexplained rest. In particular, we have completely neglected the 
dynamic effects of exchange rate policy. Static regressions which search for a relationship 
between the exchange rate regime and economic growth in the same period do not take into 
account that the growth effects of a given regime may only materialize if this regime has 
proven to be sufficiently stable. The relationship between words, deeds, and outcomes may 
thus be much more complex than suggested by the findings we presented in this study. We 
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  198. Tables 
 
Table 1: Regressions using the 3-way classifications 
  1.1: GGW  1.2: LYS  1.3: RR
mod
Dum_peg 1.043  -0.719  1.533 
 (2.09)**  (1.88)*  (2.24)** 
Dum_int 0.934  -1.629  1.932 
 (2.12)**  (3.66)***  (3.02)*** 
Invest  0.094 0.055 0.082 
 (2.95)***  (1.61)  (2.41)** 
Open  0.005 0.010 0.012 
 (0.63)  (1.40)  (2.21)** 
terms of trade  0.069  0.093  0.091 
 (1.88)*  (2.16)**  (2.39)** 
schooling  0.003 0.002 0.003 
  (2.11)** (1.65) (2.17)** 
budget_1  -0.166 -0.148 -0.212 
 (1.43)  (1.44)  (1.96)* 
income_ini  -1.186 -1.121 -1.240 
  (3.16)*** (2.73)*** (3.20)*** 
pop_growth  -1.120 -1.307 -1.184 
  (3.90)*** (3.74)*** (4.37)*** 
log_pop -0.060  -0.244  0.134 
  (0.29) (1.17) (0.80) 
civil_repress 0.067 0.309 0.030 
  (0.49) (1.65) (0.19) 
reg_ssa  -1.230 -1.684 -0.229 
 (1.98)**  (2.76)***  (0.39) 
reg_lac -0.409  -0.576  0.250 
  (0.97) (1.26) (0.61) 
dum_trans  -5.003 -4.011 -5.291 
  (4.16)*** (3.54)*** (3.88)*** 
dum_oil  0.769 1.694 1.157 
  (0.69) (1.35) (1.04) 
Constant  1.422 6.294 0.241 
 (0.68)  (2.96)***  (0.14) 
Observations  2532 2111 2186 
R-squared  0.24 0.29 0.31 
 
Comments on Table 1:  t-statistics in parentheses are based on a cluster-robust covariance matrix. Significance 
levels: * 10%,  **  5%, Niveau; *** 1%. GGW refers to the de-jure classification of Gosh, Gulde and Wolf 
(2002), LYS to the de-facto classification of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), RR
mod to the modified 
classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), with “freely-falling” episodes being assigned to exchange rate 
regimes (see Section 2.4). 
 
  20Table 2: Regressions using the 4-way classification and the flexibility-index 
  2.1: GGW  2.2: LYS  2.3: RR
mod 2.4: GGW  2.5: LYS  2.6: RR
mod
Dum_peg 1.060  -0.726  1.551       
 (2.09)**  (1.90)*  (2.25)**       
Dum_lim 0.761  -1.296  2.241       
 (1.36)  (3.33)***  (3.02)***       
Dum_man 1.081  -2.007  1.669      
 (2.05)**  (3.13)***  (2.54)**       
Flexibility index        -0.276  0.145  -0.325 
       (1.84)*  (1.17)  (1.80)* 
invest 0.094  0.055  0.082  0.096  0.057  0.090 
 (2.93)***  (1.61)  (2.44)**  (2.98)***  (1.68)*  (2.62)** 
open 0.005  0.010  0.012  0.005  0.009  0.012 
 (0.63)  (1.39)  (2.10)**  (0.66) (1.25) (1.99)** 
terms of trade  0.069  0.093  0.089  0.068  0.093  0.087 
 (1.88)*  (2.17)**  (2.42)**  (1.88)*  (2.15)**  (2.27)** 
schooling 0.003  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.003 
 (2.04)**  (1.64)  (2.32)**  (2.03)**  (1.66)*  (2.10)** 
budget_1 -0.166  -0.149  -0.215 -0.165  -0.145 -0.207 
 (1.43)  (1.45)  (1.97)*  (1.42)  (1.40)  (1.89)* 
income_ini -1.152  -1.102  -1.245  -1.206  -1.083  -1.313 
 (2.86)***  (2.67)***  (3.26)***  (3.29)***  (2.56)**  (3.40)*** 
pop_growth -1.122  -1.306  -1.176 -1.126  -1.305 -1.191 
 (3.88)***  (3.74)***  (4.40)***  (3.97)***  (3.74)***  (4.35)*** 
log_pop -0.060  -0.247  0.136  -0.044  -0.270  0.080 
 (0.30)  (1.18)  (0.82)  (0.21) (1.28) (0.49) 
civil_repress 0.061  0.312  0.045  0.066  0.299  0.031 
 (0.46)  (1.67)*  (0.29)  (0.47)  (1.61)  (0.19) 
reg_ssa -1.216  -1.672  -0.107 -1.342  -1.614 -0.668 
 (1.98)**  (2.74)***  (0.17)  (2.10)**  (2.58)**  (1.11) 
reg_lac -0.419  -0.594  0.327  -0.397  -0.696  0.044 
 (0.98)  (1.30)  (0.76)  (0.92) (1.54) (0.10) 
dum_trans -5.013  -3.986  -5.148  -4.984  -4.113  -5.269 
 (4.17)***  (3.55)***  (3.83)***  (4.12)***  (3.62)***  (3.67)*** 
dum_oil 0.724  1.688  1.286  0.799  1.605  1.468 
 (0.67)  (1.35)  (1.10)  (0.71) (1.28) (1.28) 
Constant 1.373  6.256  0.065  2.821  5.406  3.043 
 (0.66)  (2.93)***  (0.04)  (1.48)  (2.48)**  (1.76)* 
Observations 2532  2111  2186 2532  2111 2186 
R-squared 0.24  0.30  0.31  0.24  0.29  0.30 
 
Comments on Table 2:  see Table 1 
  21Table 3: Fixed effects and GMM-estimations 
  3.1: GGW  3.2: LYS  3.3: RR
mod 3.4: LYS  3.5: RR
mod
Dum_peg -0.343  -0.318  2.701     
 (0.63)  (0.67)  (3.23)***     
Dum_lim 0.219  -0.932  2.886     
 (0.36)  (2.35)**  (3.38)***     
Dum_man -0.125  -1.610  2.405     
 (0.26)  (2.72)***  (2.79)***     
Flexibility index        2.536  -2.337 
       (1.87)*  (2.84)*** 
invest 0.116  0.060  0.081  0.043  0.106 
 (2.81)***  (1.90)*  (2.60)**  (1.42)  (3.99)*** 
open -0.019  0.000  -0.001  0.016  0.003 
 (1.09)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (3.16)***  (0.57) 
terms of trade  0.058  0.081  0.082  0.107  0.061 
 (2.02)**  (2.55)**  (2.75)***  (2.95)***  (1.83)* 
schooling 0.009  0.009  0.010  0.002  0.004 
 (1.20)  (1.03)  (1.22)  (1.38)  (2.91)*** 
budget_1 -0.241  -0.217  -0.299  -0.157  -0.201 
 (1.97)*  (2.11)**  (2.81)***  (1.72)*  (2.50)** 
income_ini       -1.281  -1.080 
       (2.71)***  (3.31)*** 
pop_growth -1.156  -1.353  -1.177  -1.218  -0.826 
 (4.43)***  (4.17)***  (4.89)***  (3.45)***  (2.19)** 
log_pop -4.831  -1.699  -3.679  -0.887  0.328 
 (2.10)**  (0.90)  (1.62)  (1.81)*  (2.64)*** 
civil_repress -0.243  0.180  -0.422  0.545  0.063 
 (1.14)  (0.87)  (1.87)*  (2.81)***  (0.40) 
reg_ssa       -1.495  0.713 
       (2.21)**  (0.92) 
reg_lac       -1.162  0.419 
       (2.00)**  (1.04) 
dum_trans       -3.571  -1.173 
       (2.54)**  (1.15) 
dum_oil       3.301  1.000 
       (2.31)**  (1.43) 
Constant 9.887  3.374  4.767  -1.287  5.386 
 (1.63)  (0.68)  (0.70)  (0.61)  (2.93)*** 
Observations 2532  2111  2186  1556  1677 
R-squared 0.25  0.32  0.33     
Hansen’s J-statistic  
(p-value) 
    0.34  0.11 
 
Comments on Table 3:  See Table 1. Columns 3.1 to 3.3 are based on fixed-effects regressions, columns 3.4 
and 3.5 on IV/GMM estimations using the following instruments: area, xport3, exp_nonfuel, pol_repress, 
cbturn5. 
  22Table 4: The impact of the parallel market premium 
  4.1: GGW  4.2: LYS  4.3: RR
mod
Dum_peg 1.300  -0.817  1.817 
 (2.35)**  (1.91)*  (2.34)** 
Dum_int 0.977  -1.915  2.118 
 (2.21)**  (3.91)***  (3.03)*** 
parallel_premium  -0.000 -0.000 -0.035 
 (6.41)***  (6.10)***  (1.98)* 
invest  0.092 0.056 0.091 
  (2.64)*** (1.49) (2.70)*** 
open  0.006 0.013 0.010 
 (0.72)  (1.86)*  (1.39) 
terms of trade  0.075  0.095  0.083 
  (2.07)** (2.11)** (2.35)** 
schooling  0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (1.98)* (1.71)* (1.98)* 
budget_1  -0.216 -0.208 -0.245 
  (2.05)** (2.15)** (2.49)** 
income_ini  -0.930 -0.968 -0.844 
 (2.15)**  (2.20)**  (1.81)* 
pop_growth  -1.193 -1.244 -1.187 
  (3.93)*** (3.31)*** (4.34)*** 
log_pop 0.062  -0.135  0.161 
  (0.31) (0.61) (0.81) 
civil_repress  0.241 0.389 0.284 
 (1.42)  (1.81)*  (1.54) 
reg_ssa  -1.120 -1.845 -0.296 
 (1.82)*  (3.22)***  (0.49) 
reg_lac  0.076 0.051 0.505 
  (0.16) (0.10) (1.05) 
dum_trans  -6.211 -5.248 -6.210 
  (3.89)*** (3.15)*** (3.49)*** 
dum_oil  0.953 1.860 1.224 
  (0.81) (1.41) (1.07) 
Constant 1.058  0.368  -0.866 
  (0.45) (0.16) (0.44) 
Observations 1874  1526  1775 
R-squared  0.32 0.37 0.35 
 
Comments on Table 4:  see Table 1 
  23Table 5: Different country groups  
  Class. Countries  Dum_peg  Dum_int  Obs.  R  squ. 
















































































































Comments on Table 5:  see Table 1. To save space, the coefficients and t statistics of the control variables are 
omitted. 
 
  24Table 6: Considering “freely falling” episodes and currency crises 
  Class. Comment Dum_peg  Dum_int  Dum_FF  Obs.  R  squ. 




-- 2540  0.25 




-- 2152  0.28 




-- 2198  0.31 


























-- 2287  0.26 




-- 1912  0.32 
6.9  RR




-- 1956  0.33 
 
Comments on Table 6:  see Table 5. In the estimations underlying rows 6.1 to 6.3, regime-dummies were set 
equal to zero in episodes classified as “freely falling” by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). For the results reported in 
rows 6.4 to 6.9 we used the regime dummies of the previous estimations. For row 6.7 to 6.9, we omitted episodes 
in which, according to GGW, there was a currency crisis. 
 
  25Table 7: “Fear of floating” and “Fear of pegging” 
  7.1: LYS   7.2: RR










Dum_peg  0.022 0.810 -0.844  -1.926 0.076 2.159 
  (0.04)  (1.38) (2.96)***  (4.32)*** (0.11) (2.92)*** 
Dum_lim  0.360 0.518 0.073 -0.821 1.376 2.589 
  (0.57)  (0.76)  (0.27) (2.65)** (1.36) (2.64)** 
Dum_man  0.240 0.691 -0.361  -0.278 0.505 1.228 
  (0.38) (1.39) (0.68) (0.74) (0.71)  (2.00)** 
Dum_FoF  -0.891 0.166 -0.411 -0.739 -0.851 1.346 
 (2.14)**  (0.38)  (1.25)  (3.50)***  (1.77)*  (2.11)** 
Dum_FoP  -0.011 0.160 0.295 1.301 -0.334  -0.274 
  (0.03) (0.34) (0.65)  (4.05)***  (0.69) (0.52) 
invest  0.052 0.083 0.077 0.044 0.054 0.077 
  (1.52) (2.47)**  (2.20)** (1.28)  (1.45) (2.05)** 
open  0.010 0.012 0.018 0.028 0.005 0.008 
  (1.39) (2.19)** (1.60)  (4.11)***  (0.58)  (1.05) 
terms of 
trade 
0.094 0.088 -0.057  -0.008 0.096 0.087 
  (2.18)** (2.32)** (2.49)**  (0.34)  (2.27)** (2.34)** 
schooling  0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 
  (1.84)*  (1.85)* (1.19)  (0.81) (1.68)* (1.60) 
budget_1  -0.147 -0.206 0.033  0.001 -0.153 -0.216 
  (1.44)  (1.87)*  (0.54) (0.02) (1.51)  (1.94)* 
income_ini  -1.124 -1.263 -2.660 -2.455 -0.804 -0.686 
  (2.52)**  (3.03)*** (3.64)*** (3.51)***  (1.44)  (1.16) 
pop_growth  -1.307 -1.194 -0.426 -0.380 -1.363 -1.268 
  (3.68)*** (4.25)***  (1.88)*  (1.72)  (3.70)*** (4.32)*** 
log_pop -0.208 0.078 0.119 0.280 -0.263 0.112 
  (0.99) (0.47) (0.58)  (2.52)**  (0.91) (0.45) 
civil_repress  0.280 -0.020 -0.410 -0.315 0.127 -0.232 
  (1.57) (0.13) (1.09) (1.30) (0.75) (1.57) 
reg_ssa  -1.506 -0.538      -1.712 -0.616 
 (2.53)**  (0.86)      (2.72)***  (0.92) 
reg_lac -0.623  0.026      -1.680  -1.059 
 (1.37)  (0.06)      (2.55)**  (1.45) 
dum_trans  -4.052 -5.542      -5.298 -6.936 
  (3.12)***  (3.89)***    (3.39)***  (4.20)*** 
dum_oil 1.661 1.298 0.575 -0.434 1.282 0.681 
  (1.35) (1.22) (1.00) (0.84) (1.08) (0.67) 
Constant  5.521 1.687 9.291 9.435 6.785 3.124 
  (2.24)** (0.92) (2.45)**  (2.89)***  (2.50)** (1.26) 
Obs.  2093 2159  463  552  1630 1607 
R-squared  0.29 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.31 0.33 
 
Comments on Table 7:  see Table 1. Columns 7.1 and 7.2 are based on the entire sample. Columns 7.3 and 7.4 
use only “industrial” countries, columns 7.5 and 7.6 only non-industrial countries. 
 
9. Data Appendix 
  26Our sample contains data for 167 countries and covers the period from 1974 to 1999. A 
country is classified as an advanced country if its GNI per capita in the year 2005 was higher 
than 10726 USD. If a country is included in Morgan Stanley’s MSCI index it is classified as 
an emerging market. The remaining countries are classified as developing countries.  
 
Advanced Countries 
Netherlands Antilles, Australia*, Austria, Belgium, Bahrain, Bahamas, Canada, 
Switzerland, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, 
Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Qatar, Singapore, Slovenia, Sweden, United Arab 
Emirates, United States. 
* Countries in bold letters are classified as industrial countries by LYS.  
 
Developing Countries 
Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Antigua & Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Barbados, 
Botswana, Central African Republic, Cote D'Ivoire, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Comoros, 
Cape Verde, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Algeria, Ecuador, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Hong Kong, Honduras, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People's Dem. Rep, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, St. Lucia, Sri 
Lanka, Lesotho, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Myanmar, 
Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Nepal, Oman, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Romania, Rwanda, Sudan, Senegal, Solomon Islands, 
Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Somalia, São Tomé & Príncipe, Suriname, Slovak Republic, 
Swaziland, Seychelles, Syrian Arab Republic, Chad, Togo, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Tonga, 
Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, S.Vincent & 
Grenadines, Vietnam, Vanuatu, Samoa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia,  Zimbabwe. 
 
Emerging Markets 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China (Mainland), Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, 
Indonesia, India, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Mexico, Malaysia, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, South Africa. 
Definitions and sources of variables: 
  27growth: Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Source: Gosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002). 
invest: Ratio of gross investments to GDP. Source: Gosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002). 
open: Proxy for degree of openness of an economy. Open is the ratio of (Exports + Imports) 
to GDP. Source: Gosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002), own calculations. 
terms-of-trade: Terms of trade growth rate (3 year backward average). Source: Gosh, Gulde 
and Wolf (2002). 
budget: Ratio of the central government balance to GDP. Source: Gosh, Gulde and Wolf 
(2002). 
schooling: Average years of schooling in the total population over age 25. Source: Gosh, 
Gulde and Wolf (2002). 
income_ini: Logarithm of the ratio of the national GDP per capita to the US per capita GDP 
in 1970, calculated in international prices. Source: Gosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002).  
log_pop: Logarithm of the total population. Source: Gosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002). 
pop_growth: Growth rate of the total population. Source: Gosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002). 
civil_repress: Index, measuring the degree of civil liberties. The index ranges from 1 (max. 
freedom) to 7 (min. freedom). Source: Freedom House. 
reg_ssa: Regional dummy, equal to 1 if a country is located in Sub Saharan Africa, 0 
otherwise. Source: World Bank (2005).  
reg_lac: Regional dummy, equal to 1 if a country is located in Latin America, 0 otherwise. 
Source: World Bank (2005). 
dum_trans: Dummy, equal to 1 if a country is characterized as a transition country, 0 
otherwise.  Source: World Bank (2005). 
dum_oil: Oil dummy, equal to 1 for the following countries: Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Russia, Norway, 
Kazakhstan, 0 otherwise. Source: OPEC, own calculations. 
area: country area in square kilometers. Source: World Bank (2005) 
xport3: Share of total exports to three largest trading partners. Source: Gosh, Gulde and Wolf 
(2002). 
pol_repress: Index, measuring the extent of political rights. The index ranges from 1 (max. 
rights) to 7 (min. rights). Source: Freedom House. 
cbturn5: Central bank governor turnover rate in the preceding five years. Proxy for central 
bank independence. Source: Gosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002). 
exp_nonfuel: Dummy, equal to 1 if a country is specialized in the export of non-fuel raw 
materials, 0 otherwise. Source: World Bank (2005). 
  28parallel_premium: Ratio of parallel market exchange rate over the official exchange rate. 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), own calculations. 
dum_crisis: Dummy, equal to 1 if a currency crisis has occured in a country, 0 otherwise. 
Source: Gosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002), Note: The Gosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) data based on 
Glick and Hutchison (1999). 
jure_ind4w: Exchange rate regime index. The index ranges from 1 to 4, where 1 equals a 
Peg, 2 equals Limited flexibility, 3 equals Managed float and 4 equals a Float. The category 
Peg includes the following IMF subcategories: Dollarization, Currency board, Currency 
Union, Single currency peg, Published basket peg, and Secret basket peg. The category 
Limited flexibility includes the subcategories: Cooperative system, Crawling Peg, and Target 
zone. The category Managed float includes the subcategories: Unclassified rule-based 
intervention, Managed float with heavy intervention, Unclassified managed float, and Other 
float. Finally, the category Float includes the subcategories: Float with light intervention and 
Float with no intervention. Source: Gosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002), own calculations. 
jure_ind3w: Exchange rate regime index based on jure_ind4w. The index ranges from 1 to 3 
because the categories Limited flexibility and Managed float are combined in the new 
category Intermediate. Source: Gosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002). 
rr_ind4w: De facto exchange rate regime index according to RR
mod. The index ranges from 1 
to 4, where 1 equals a Peg, 2 equals Limited flexibility, 3 equals Managed float and 4 equals a 
Float. The category Peg includes the following subcategories: No separate legal tender, Pre-
announced peg or currency board arrangement, Pre-announced horizontal band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2%, and de facto peg. The category Limited flexibility includes 
the subcategories: Pre-announced crawling band, Pre-announced crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2%, De facto crawling peg, and De facto crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2%. The category Managed float includes the subcategories: Pre-
announced crawling band that is wider than +/-2%, De facto crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/-5%, Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (This definition 
allows for appreciations and depreciations over time.), and Managed float. The category Float 
includes the subcategory: Freely Floating. In their original classification, RR use an additional 
category, Freely falling. This category includes every country-year observation where the 
annual inflation rate exceeded 40 percent. Using the information in the RR country 
chronologies, one is able to assign each country-year observation to a de facto exchange rate 
regime to which it would have belonged, had it not been classified as Freely falling. Source: 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), own calculations. 
  29rr_ind3w: Exchange rate regime index based on rr_ind4w. The index ranges from 1 to 3, 
combining the categories Limited flexibility and Managed float in the new category 
Intermediate. Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), own calculations. 
dum_FF: Regime dummy, equal to 1 if a regime is classified as freely falling, 0 otherwise. 
Source: Own calculations. 
lys_ind4w: De facto exchange rate regime index according to LYS. The classification scheme 
is based on the LYS 5-way classification. We have dropped the category Inconclusives. 
Hence, the index ranges from 1 to 4, where 1 equals a Peg, 2 equals Limited flexibility (LYS 
label this category as Dirty/Crawling peg), 3 equals Managed float (LYS label this category 
as  Dirty) and 4 equals a Float. Source: Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), own 
calculations. 
lys_ind3w: Exchange rate regime index based on lys_ind4w. The index ranges from 1 to 3, 
combining the categories Limited flexibility and Managed float in the new category 
Intermediate. Source: Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). 
dum_z_x: Regime dummy, equal to 1 if the regime „z“ according to the classification 
procedure of „x“ is established with z ∈ {Peg, Intermediate, Limited flexibility, Managed 
float} and x ∈ {GGW, LYS, RR
mod }. Source: own calculations. 
dum_FoF: Fear of Floating dummy variable, equal to 1 if the de-facto exchange rate regime 
according to LYS or RR_mod is more restrictive than the de jure exchange rate regime, 0 
otherwise. Source: Own calculations based on Alesina and Wagner (2006). 
dum_FoP: Fear of Pegging dummy variable, equal to 1 if the de-facto exchange rate regime 
according to LYS or RR_mod is less restrictive than the de jure exchange rate regime, 0 
otherwise. Source: Own calculations based on Alesina and Wagner (2006). 
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